search Council; U.S. Office of Technology fers by exerting political pressure. The list of ways Assessment). However, others argue that such a to exert pressure is long, but would include lobbyprogram structure will make agricultural research ing expenditures (in money and in time), campaign and extension less productive (Just and Huffman; contributions, bribes and kickbacks, demonstraHuffman and Evenson; Chubin and Hackett). Crit-tions, strikes, and riots. Demand curve shifters inics argue that it encourages short-term, applied elude the size of the group and the anticipated gain projects with sure payoffs at the expense of long-per group member from the program(s) under conterm, more basic, or riskier projects that might sideration (Becker; Gardner; Peltzman) . Group ultimately generate higher returns. They also claim size in general has an ambiguous effect on political that the year-to-year funding variability inherent in influence. On the one hand, a larger group size the competitive grant process reduces productivity, means that a group can spend more in money and and that time spent writing grant proposals is di-in time on exerting political pressure, holding exverted from research activity. In addition, they as-penditures per group member constant. This group sert that hidden and major conflicts of interest po-size effect is especially disadvantageous for very liticize committee review processes, causing com-small groups, because there are often fixed costs to mittees to reward friends and associates.
participating in the political process that make po-LISA/SARE has probably not existed long litical activity by these groups uneconomic. As enough to make a decision on administrative struc-group size increases, these fixed costs impose a ture with respect to this program. However, the smaller burden on each group member. On the performance of LISA/SARE in reference to the other hand, a larger group size worsens free rider allocation of funds can be evaluated, especially the problems, because everyone is more inclined to influence of political considerations on funding de-leave the expenditure of resources for lobbying, cisions. The objective of this article is to consider making contributions, demonstrating, etc. to oththe political, economic, and environmental factors ers. The result is that, for large groups, expendiaffecting the distribution of LISA money among tures per group member tend to decline as group states during fiscal years (FYs) 1988-89 . A polit-size increases. ical "market" for LISA funds is constructed and Politicians and bureaucrats supply income transthen used to construct an empirical model of the fers by raising funds (through a wide variety of allocation of funds. We focus on 1988-89 because programs) and then channeling them through the data on LISA/SARE allocations for later years political and bureaucratic process toward groups were unavailable when this study was initiated. that are demanding transfers. The costs of raising Furthermore, LISA had much clearer objectives funds depend on the economic environment and on than SARE, which facilitates model formulation.
the instruments used to obtain funds (e.g., an output subsidy financed by taxpayers vs. a price floor The Market for LISA Funds financed by consumers and taxpayers). The costs of channeling funds through the political and buIn modeling the allocation of LISA research and reaucratic process depend on the program(s) under extension funds among states, it is helpful to fol-consideration and the overall political environlow earlier studies of agricultural research and ex-ment. Some factors within the context of the LISA tension funding in using the theoretical concept of program that affect the cost of transferring funds, a market for government programs (e.g., Guttman; and thus shift the supply curve for income transHuffman and Miranowski; Rose-Ackerman and fers, are discussed below. The costs of transferring Evenson; White and Araji). Like any market, this funds also depend on competing demands for one has both demanders and suppliers. The de-funds. Clearly, resources devoted to one program manders in a political market are the groups that cannot be spent elsewhere. While the general pubbenefit from the program(s) under consideration. lic may be unaware of the fact that a particular The suppliers are the politicians and bureaucrats program even exists, politicians and bureaucrats who institute and administer the program(s). The recognize that the program is consuming resources good being exchanged is income, with the pro-that could have been used to garner political supgram(s) as the vehicle for this exchange. Payment port from other interest groups. for the good can take a wide variety of forms, For the LISA program, important groups on the depending on the program(s) and the overall polit-demand side include public-interest groups with a ical environment. Some examples within the con-concern about the environmental and health effects text of the LISA program are discussed below, of fertilizers and pesticides, because LISA was in In general, a group "demands" income trans-part an attempt to reduce the usage of these inputs (Madden). Farm and rural groups also belong on the fact that every state has limits on its political the demand side, because farm financial stress and influence in Washington, DC. Scarce political capassociated rural economic hardships have created ital used to garner LISA funds is capital that cannot interest in cost-reducing technologies (Daberkow be used to obtain other funds. and Reichelderfer). These groups may also be in-
The "price" of LISA funds has political and terested in developing technologies for their state monetary components. For members of Congress, that are consistent with evolving regulations on it is measured in votes, campaign contributions, pollution and food safety. In addition, states com-in-kind campaign assistance, and other political fapete with each other in agricultural markets. Farm vors. For USDA officials and LISA administraand rural groups in one state might lobby for LISA tors, it is measured in salaries, benefits, research funds simply to prevent the money from going to support, and other types of assistance provided by another state. their respective institutions. Some components of One would expect the demand for LISA funding this price are easily observable (e.g., campaign by public-interest groups and others concerned contributions), but others are not because of priabout the environment and public health to be an vacy considerations (e.g., salaries and benefits). In increasing function of perceived dangers from ag-any case, estimating the marginal impact of LISA ricultural chemicals. Risks to the environment and funds on votes for members of Congress, camhuman health from agricultural chemicals vary paign contributions, or other observable compofrom one region to another because both the extent nents of this price would be difficult and fraught of chemical usage and the risks from any given with error. This article therefore uses a reducedlevel of usage vary by location. One would also form formulation expressing LISA expenditures in expect demand for LISA funding by farm and rural a given state as a function of the above demand and groups to be an increasing function of farm finan-supply shifters. This is a common practice in the cial stress.
literature on program funding across states, includThe supply side for LISA includes those who ing agricultural research and extension. make allocation decisions: members of Congress, U.S. Department of Agriculture officials, and the decentralized administrators of the LISA program. Data and Econometric Methods Clearly, it is easier to secure LISA money for a state if its Congressional delegation is in a position This section presents the data, variables, and estito influence allocation decisions. It is also easier if mation methods. The unit of analysis in this study LISA administrators or USDA officials are partial is the state. Summary statistics for all variables are to that state. LISA administrators and proposal re-shown in Table 1 , while data sources and complete viewers may also favor grant applications from variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. their own institution or state for self-interest mo-Of the 50 states, 44 received LISA funds (the six tives. While such motives may not be explicit, without any funds were Alabama, Florida, Kenstandard political-economic reasoning suggests tucky, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Rhode Isthat they are likely implicit (Chubin and Hackett). land). In this context, the fact that LISA applications are It may be noted that the four host institutions reviewed at a regional level rather than a national seemed to receive a disproportionate amount of level is important. A region may be less likely to LISA money during the first two years of the prohave a sufficient number of disinterested scientists gram. Of the $5.52 million in LISA funding during to review proposals than the country as a whole. FYs 1988-89, the four host universities received Personal relationships may also be stronger among $1.07 million (19%) (USDA, . On scientists and administrators within a region than average, states with host institutions received within the country as a whole.
about 200% more in LISA funds than states withCompeting demands on LISA funds also shift out host institutions. By comparison, states with the supply curve for reasons discussed above. As host institutions received only 7.8% of total federal the non-rural population increases, the number of agricultural research dollars during FYs 1988-89 people on which and variety of ways in which (USDA, Inventory of Agricultural Research). To LISA funds could have been spent also increases. help obtain a feel for the data, it is also useful to Since LISA is a federally funded program, one examine the association between LISA allocations might argue that channeling LISA funds to a state and total federal agricultural research allocations. does not preclude channeling other federal funds to The correlation coefficient between the two varithat state's urban interests. However, this ignores ables is not statistically different from zero (0.18, regions. In the second stage, each region divided its funds among its member states. The economett-ratio = 1.2). However, the real test of the impact ric model used here attempts to explain the two on LISA allocations of either total federal agricul-stages as a whole rather than separately. It would tural research allocations or of having a host insti-be interesting to model each stage separately, but tution is in the regressions below, since they hold that would require additional years of data on other relevant variables constant.
LISA/SARE allocations that were unavailable to The ten states with the largest LISA funding are us. Regional dummies are included in the regreslisted in Table 2 , along with the ten states with the sions in order to capture differences among regions in the first stage of the allocation process not ac-tion, total expenditures by farmers on commercial counted for by the other explanatory variables. fertilizer and expenditures on other agricultural On the demand side, the sum of membership in chemicals (which are largely pesticides) are inthe Institute for Alternative Agriculture (IAA) and cluded as demand shifters. To test the extent to the American Farmland Trust (AFT) is used to which farm financial stress affected the intensity of represent environmental pressure groups with a support for LISA among farm and rural groups, specific interest in agriculture. IAA includes re-annual losses incurred by banks on farm loans are searchers and others directly interested in LISA, included in the analysis as another demand shifter. and has grown rapidly since its creation in 1983
A set of dummy variables is used to model the (Swenson). The focus of AFT is on broader agri-supply side for LISA funding. The first dummy cultural conservation issues, but it is also inter-variable equals one if the state has a host LISA ested in LISA. AFT is also included because of its institution and zero otherwise. Another dummy substantial political influence (Browne). The sum variable equals one if the state had a ranking Senof IAA and AFT membership is used rather than ator on the Agriculture Committee or the Agricultwo separate membership variables because of the ture Subcommittee of the Appropriations Commithigh correlation coefficient (0.78, t-ratio = 8.6) tee in the 100th (1987-88) or 101st (1989-90) between membership in these two organizations. Congresses. (A ranking Senator is a committee While this sum may introduce double-counting, chairperson or a ranking minority member of the that is not necessarily undesirable. A person be-committee). A similar dummy variable is included longing to both groups may be more active than a for the House of Representatives. Also included on person belonging to just one; more concretely, a the supply side is the size of the urban population. person belonging to both is contributing member-As noted above, the number of people on which ship dues twice. and the variety of other ways in which LISA funds The other political pressure groups included on could have been spent increases as the urban popthe demand side are farmers as a whole, the rural-ulation increases, shifting the supply curve inward. nonfarm population, and the Farm Bureau. The
Other potential supply and demand shifters are Farm Bureau is the largest farm organization and unmeasurable or not easily measured. To capture has been skeptical of LISA (Korves), so that its any variables common to LISA and other federal support for LISA may be less than farmers or rural agricultural research programs, average annual people generally.
federal agricultural research expenditures (on all It should be noted that including these group programs) during FYs 1988-89 are included. size variables in the model does not presume that
The most important variables missing from the each person in every interest group has heard of analysis are measures of the number, size, and LISA. It only presumes that (1) the leaders of these quality of LISA grant proposals submitted by ingroups and their legislators in Congress are aware vestigators in each state. Some states might have of the program, and (2) these leaders and legisla-received little money simply because few efforts tors are looking out for what they perceive to be were made to secure funds. Unfortunately, no data the best interests of their groups. As indicated ear-were available to us on submissions. In any case, lier, the size of a group affects its political influ-submissions would probably also need to be made ence. The leaders of a group with more influence endogenous, because investigators may respond to can bargain more effectively for programs that the same political-economic considerations that afthey perceive will benefit their members, such as fect final funding decisions, either directly or LISA for the groups that we study. through signals from administrative superiors. The As discussed above, theory suggests the rela-IAA/AFT variable may proxy for potential applitionship between group size and political influence cants in a state because it is plausible that most may be nonlinear, since there are forces that tend applicants were members of these organizations. to make both small and large groups politically A tobit model is used in estimation because of weaker than medium-sized groups. We tried in-zero values for the dependent variable in six states. cluding the squares of group sizes in addition to the The tobit model captures both the decision to algroup sizes themselves to capture any nonlineari-locate or not to allocate funds to a particular state ties, but multicollinearity prevented us from ob-and the decision about how much to allocate, given taining any satisfactory results. Thus we report the that funds are going to be allocated (see Maddala). results without these quadratic terms.
In estimating the tobit model, the dependent To capture the intensity of concern among en-variable and all the continuous (non-dummy) invironmental organizations about agricultural pollu-dependent variables are divided by their sample means. This transformation yields unit-free vari-states had host institutions. Evaluation of this poables. The coefficients on the continuous indepen-tential problem would require additional years of dent variables are (approximately) elasticities with data. this transformation, and the coefficients on the dummy variables, when multiplied by 100, show the percentage changes in LISA funding due to Results and Discussion these dummies.
1 Logarithmic transformations were also tried, with ln(l + LISA) used as the Maximum-likelihood estimates for two tobit moddependent variable in order to take care of the els are shown in Table 3 . The total federal agricases where LISA = 0. However, the results in-cultural research funds variable is included in the dicated that a log model is not at all appropriate for first model, while it is excluded from the second the data. Goodness-of-fit measures were very low model. The estimated coefficient on this variable and almost all the estimated coefficients were sta-in the first model is not statistically significant. tistically insignificant.
With a few exceptions, estimated coefficients and Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are asymptotic t-ratios for the other variables are simcalculated by both the usual method and with a ilar between the two models. This robustness inmethod in White that is robust to model specifica-dicates that fundamentally different politicaltion error. Let A be the matrix of second deriva-economic forces are driving LISA spending and tives of the log-likelihood function and let B be the federal agricultural research spending generally. cross-product of the first derivatives. White's ro-
The standard error for the host institution varibust covariance matrix for the coefficient estimates able is significantly smaller with White's method is A-BA-1. Under the usual assumption of in-than with the usual method, while the other stanformation matrix equivalence (A = -B), White's dard errors are close to each other. These similarmatrix collapses to the usual -A-. For compar-ities in standard errors suggest that specification ison, t-ratios calculated by the usual method are error has only a limited impact on the results, exalso reported below.
cept perhaps for the host institution. Even in that The results here could be contaminated by si-case, the statements below regarding asymptotic multaneous equation bias, since IAA/AFT mem-statistical significance or insignificance are unafbership is treated as exogenous. Both groups are fected by the choice of the covariance matrix. very interested in LISA, and LISA expenditures Among pressure groups, the estimated coefficould increase their membership. Smith and Blun-cient for IAA/AFT membership is large in magnidell's test for exogeneity was used to evaluate the tude and highly statistically significant. The results potential for simultaneity. For this test, the vari-indicate that a 10% increase in IAA/AFT memberable of concern (IAA/AFT membership) is re-ship is associated with about a 10% increase in gressed on a set of exogenous variables, and the LISA spending, a substantial effect. In contrast, residual from that equation is included as an ex-the estimated coefficient for Farm Bureau is staplanatory variable in the tobit equation. If the re-tistically insignificant. The numbers of farms is sidual is statistically insignificant, the variable of statistically significant and positive. Holding other concern can be treated as exogenous. The variables variables constant, a 10% increase in numbers of included in the IAA/AFT equation were member-farms is associated with about a 4% increase in ship in general environmental organizations (see LISA allocations. Farmers generally appear to supthe Appendix), farms, rural-nonfarm population, port LISA, but this support is not statistically urban population, per capita income, and dummies greater or smaller for farmers who are also Farm based on the Census Bureau regions.
Bureau members. The host institution variable might also be enSupport for LISA is at least as strong among the dogenous. However, testing or correcting for si-rural-nonfarm population as among farmers. A multaneity here is impossible because only four 10% increase in the rural-nonfarm population is associated with about a 5-8% increase in LISA allocations. However, the differences between the 1 The model is of the form Yy = a + E3pixi i + jyjzj,, where y, estimated rural-nonfarm and farm coefficients are is the dependent variable for the tth observation, the x, are the non-not statistically significant (t-ratio = 1.2 for the dummy independent variables, and the zj, are the dummy independent first model, 0.6 for the second model). ronmental and health risks posed by current pro-duction practices. Fertilizer and chemical expendi-on the residual from the IAA/AFT equation is 0.17 tures measured on a per acre basis were also tried (0.4). Furthermore, other coefficient estimates do in regressions not reported here, but they were not not vary much from the models in Table 3 . Among statistically significant either. Other measures of the statistically significant variables, the average environmental and health risks (e.g., groundwater percentage change in the coefficient estimate contamination figures in Nielson and Lee) were caused by including this residual is less than 5%. also tried, but were not statistically significant.
In the equation without total federal agricultural The estimated coefficient for farm loan losses is research funding, the estimated coefficient (t-ratio) positive, small in magnitude, and statistically sig-on the residual from the IAA/AFT equation is 0.24 nificant at the 10% level but not the 5% level. The (0.6). Among the statistically significant variables, results indicate that a 10% increase in farm loan the average percentage change in the coefficient losses is associated with about a 2% increase in estimates in this case is only about 7%. LISA disbursements. These results support the view discussed above that the farm financial crisis of the 1980s played only a supporting role in the Conclusions LISA program.
The results for the supply-side variables are The objective of this article was to consider the largely consistent with prior expectations. States political economy of allocation of research and exwith a regional coordinator receive more LISA al-tension spending on the LISA program among locations, and this effect is statistically significant.
states during its first two years. Results indicate Other things equal, the difference is about 60%. that the disbursement of LISA money is strongly While large, this effect is less than the 200% dif-related to political considerations. On the demand ference that one sees in the raw data on LISA side of the market for LISA funds, membership in allocations (i.e., the difference not holding other political pressure groups definitely matters. The things constant).
allocation of LISA funds to a state is highly reSimilarly, the estimated coefficient for Senate sponsive to membership in that state in the Amerkey committee is positive and statistically signifi-ican Farmland Trust and the Institute for Altemacant. Having a key Senate committee member is tive Agriculture, two public-interest groups with a associated with about a 70% increase in LISA dis-strong interest in LISA. LISA allocations also rebursements. The four states with these Senators spond positively and to a significant degree to the were Vermont, Indiana, North Dakota, and Mis-number of farms and the rural-nonfarm population sissippi. However, only Vermont is among the top in the state. 10 in LISA allocations, so this variable does not Variables included to measure the intensity of explain the rankings in Table 2 by itself. In con-demand among states were not generally importrast, the House key committee variable is statisti-tant. In particular, the results provide only limited cally insignificant. Texas, Illinois, Mississippi, support for the view that LISA was a response to and Massachusetts are the states with these mem-recent financial problems faced by farmers. Rebers. Ironically, two of these states were among sults indicate that states with higher farm loan the highest ten LISA allocations in Table 2. losses received more LISA money than other As expected, the estimated coefficient for urban states, but not a lot more. More surprisingly, LISA population is negative and statistically significant. allocations were not related to the use of fertilizer A 10% increase in the urban population is associ-or pesticides, which was an important motive for ated with a 8-10% decrease in LISA allocations.
establishing the program. The dummy variables for the North Central and On the supply side of the market for LISA South regions are statistically insignificant, while funds, states with host institutions receive signifithe estimated coefficient for the West dummy is cantly more money, even after controlling for positive and significant at the 10% level but not the other factors. Similarly, states with Senators in 5% level. This effect is related to regional alloca-leadership positions on key agricultural committion decisions to the West vs. the Northeast in the tees receive substantially larger LISA allocations. first-stage of the two-stage process discussed These results support general concerns raised above (allocate money to regions, then divide each about the politicization of competitive grant fundregion's money among its member states).
ing (Chubin and Hackett). On the other hand, havResults of the Smith-Blundell test indicate that ing a Representative in a similar position in the IAA/AFT membership can be treated as exoge-House does not have a statistically significant efnous. In the equation with total federal agricultural fect on LISA allocations. Members of the House research funding, the estimated coefficient (t-ratio) apparently use their political influence elsewhere. NOTE: An * denotes significance at the 10% level, based on t-ratios calculated using White's method. The predicted value of the dependent variable, LISA, is Pt = (t,'x, + ar,, where P is the vector of coefficient estimates, x, is the vector of exogenous variables, and a is the estimated standard error. ,(I and (4, are the distribution function and the density function of the standard normal, respectively, evaluated at 3'x/cr.
